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I investigate the idea that campaign spending limits may help to “level the
playing ﬁeld” in electoral competition between parties who have unequal access
to campaign funds. The model assumes that the supporters of one party are
on average wealthier than those who support a competing party. Contributions
are used to ﬁnance advertisements that truthfully reveal information about the
quality of candidates. Voters update their beliefs rationally based on informa-
tion revealed during the campaign. Rational beliefs are shown to “compensate”
for funding asymmetries in equilibrium. As a result, asymmetries in access to
funds do not bias the electoral outcome from an ex ante perspective. A limit on
campaign expenditures does not aﬀect the relative chances of the two parties,
while leading to unintended negative consequences. I conclude that the “level
playing ﬁeld” argument in support of expenditure limitations is inconsistent
with the key assumptions of the analysis and oﬀer some suggestions for future
research.
1 Introduction
This paper investigates the policy implications of asymmetries in the access of po-
litical parties to campaign contributions. Such asymmetries might be expected to
bestow an advantage on the party that has better access to funds. As a result, one
might expect that electoral outcomes will be skewed in favor of that party. If this
is the case, moderate voters and those supporting the ﬁnancially weaker party may
beneﬁt from a policy that imposes limits on campaign contributions. Those sup-
porting the ﬁnancially stronger party would be worse oﬀ under such a policy. This
intuition suggests that a policy aiming to “level the playing ﬁeld” by imposing limits
on contributions will redistribute welfare from a partisan minority to a majority of
voters.
In the following analysis, I examine this intuition using a simple model of political
competition with campaign contributions and rational voters. The analysis assumes
1that candidates use contributions to provide truthful information to voters, and that
voters update their beliefs rationally based on that information. Contributions are
assumed to come from partisan interest groups. Asymmetry in access to funds is
modeled as an asymmetry in the membership size of these groups1.
Speciﬁcally, there are two political parties that represent diﬀerent ideologies. Each
party puts forth a candidate who shares its ideology. While it is always possible to
ﬁnd such a candidate, parties may not always be able to ﬁnd one who is “qualiﬁed.” A
qualiﬁed candidate is one who has a veriﬁable record of previous achievements, such as
having held political oﬃce or having completed a distinguished career in the military.
While voters can infer a candidate’s ideological position from her party label, they
do not know prior to the campaign whether or not she is qualiﬁed. Candidates can
use an advertising technology to inform voters of their qualiﬁcations. Ideologically
moderate swing voters who do not have a strong preference for either party may base
their voting decisions on this information. This motivates partisan interest groups to
contribute funds to qualiﬁed candidates, who spend them on advertisements.
The analysis in this paper shows that the intuition outlined in the opening para-
graph is not consistent with the above set of assumptions. In particular, the main
result of the paper is that an asymmetry in access to funds does not inﬂuence the
outcome of the election from an ex ante perspective. Intuitively, the reason is as
follows. If a party has good access to funds, voters come to expect that they will see
advertisements informing them whenever the party has found a qualiﬁed candidate.
As a consequence, voters who receive no information about the ﬁnancially stronger
party’s candidate will conclude that she is unlikely to be qualiﬁed. In contrast, voters
are willing to give the weaker party’s candidate the “beneﬁt of the doubt”. This
implies that access to contributions is actually a disadvantage when a party’s candi-
date is unqualiﬁed. This disadvantage counterbalances the advantage enjoyed by the
ﬁnancially stronger party when their candidate is qualiﬁed. The consequence is that
the ex ante probability that a party wins is actually independent of its ability to raise
contributions.
A corollary to this result is that the introduction of contribution limits would
actually harm moderate voters and those supporting the ﬁnancially weaker party.
This is because such limits will have no eﬀect on the prior probability that either party
wins, while lowering the probability that a qualiﬁed leader is elected. Surprisingly,
the only group that may beneﬁtf r o ms u c hap o l i c yi nt h i sc o n t e x ta r et h em e m b e r s
of the ﬁnancially stronger interest group. The reason for this is that they save some
of the money they would otherwise have spent on contributions. It turns out, in fact,
that the members of the ﬁnancially stronger group always prefer at least a marginal
limit on contributions.
Thus, the conclusions suggested by the formal analysis of this model are diﬀerent
from what might have been expected intuitively. This tension between the formal
results and prior intuition suggests several avenues for future research, including em-
pirical testing and alternative theoretical formulations. This is discussed further in
1An alternative interpretation of the size parameter is that the members of one interest group
are wealthier, so that they enjoy a lower marginal utility of wealth.
2the conclusion. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a
brief review of related literature. Section 3 presents the formal model and the equi-
librium concept. Section 4 discusses properties of the equilibrium in the absence of
contribution limits and presents the main result of the paper. Section 5 deals with
the eﬀects of a campaign ﬁnance policy that imposes limits. Section 6 concludes.
Proofs are contained in the appendix.
2 Related Literature
Formal models of elections with campaign contributions can be categorized according
to two aspects. The ﬁrst distinction concerns assumptions about the motivation
of campaign contributors. The second concerns assumptions about the eﬀects of
campaign spending on voter behavior and election outcomes. The literature reveals
that conclusions about the desirability of campaign ﬁnance policies diﬀer depending
on the particular combination of assumptions employed.
“Inﬂuence” vs. “electoral” contribution motives There are essentially two
reasons why an interest groups may choose to contribute money to a political can-
didate. First, the candidate may, in exchange for the contribution, shift her policy
position, or promise to perform special favors in the event that she should win the
election. This has been referred to as the “inﬂuence” or “service” motive to con-
tribute (see Ashworth 2005, Coate 2004, Grossman and Helpman 1996, Prat 2000).
Alternatively, an interest group may simply contribute to a candidate in order to
improve her chances of winning the election, without expecting the candidate to shift
her position or provide favors in return. This has been referred to as the “electoral”
or “position induced” motive to contribute (Baron 1994, Austen-Smith 1987, Coate
2001).2
T h em a i nc o n c e r ni nt h ep r e v i o u sl i t e r a t u r eh a sbe e nt h a tbo t hs e r v i c ea n dpo s i t i o n
induced contributions may inﬂuence the behavior of politicians. If contributions can
improve a candidate’s chances of winning, they may induce her to shift her policy
stance, or to promise favors to special interests. Thus, both types of models provide
an explanation for special-interest legislation and the divergence of policy platforms
from the median voter’s ideal point. In addition, they point to a potential ineﬃciency,
and the possibility of a welfare-enhancing role for campaign ﬁnance policy.
“Impressionable” vs. “rational” voters The second aspect with respect to
which existing models diﬀer is in their assumptions about how and why campaign
spending aﬀects the outcome of an election. One group of models simply assumes
2There is a considerable debate as to which of these motives dominates in reality, although they
are by no means mutually exclusive. In fact, most models that allow for service-induced contributions
give rise to both kinds of incentives. Prat (2002b) and Grossman and Helpman (1996) argue that
the electoral incentive disappears only when the number of interest groups is large, so that each
interest group takes the probability with which candidates are elected as given.
3that money can be used to directly inﬂuence the choices of “impressionable” voters,
without explicitly modeling these choices (Grossman and Helpman 1996, Baron 1994).
These models have been criticized for a lack of micro-foundation (see Prat 2000). In
addition, the lack of speciﬁed individual utility functions for some citizens precludes
welfare analysis. The main conclusion to be drawn from this literature is therefore
positive. If candidates seek to maximize their chances of being elected, they will
perceive a trade-oﬀ between catering to the median informed voter, in order to gain
informed votes, and catering to special interests, in order to obtain money that can be
used to “buy” uninformed votes. As a consequence, equilibrium policy positions will
diverge signiﬁcantly from the median informed voter’s ideal point when the fraction
of “impressionable” voters is large.
Another set of models treats all voters as rational agents, some or all of whom
are uncertain about candidate characteristics or policy positions. Campaign spending
can inﬂuence the behavior of imperfectly informed voters by reducing this uncertainty
in one of two ways. One strand of literature argues that campaign spending can be
indirectly informative (Prat 2000). This literature tells a classic signalling story.
Although candidates cannot send credible messages to voters, they can engage in the
costly activity of “burning” money to prove that informed interest groups consider
them competent. Therefore voters rationally infer competence from the size of a
candidate’s “war chest“. Another strand of the “rational voter” literature makes the
somewhat simpler assumption that money can be used to send costly but directly
informative messages to voters (Ashworth 2005, Coate 2001 and 2004). The idea is
that campaign messages convey veriﬁable information, and that candidates cannot
lie for reasons outside of the model.
Policy Implications T h el i t e r a t u r eo ni n f o r m a t i v ea d v e r t i s i n gi d e n t i ﬁes both pos-
itive and negative aspects of campaign contributions. On the one hand, the need to
attract contributions may induce politicians to move their policy platforms away from
the median voter’s ideal point, or to oﬀer favors to special interest groups. On the
other hand, contributions may help to provide information about the candidates to
voters. This trade-oﬀ implies that policy recommendations are not straightforward,
and it turns out that the models lead to diﬀerent policy conclusions. Two types
of policies are typically considered. The ﬁrst is a simple contribution cap or ban,
the second is a combination of spending caps and public ﬁnancing through matching
funds.
In signalling models, the beneﬁt of campaign spending arises because it induces a
separating equilibrium, allowing voters to distinguish between qualiﬁed and unqual-
iﬁed candidates. On the other hand, voters incur a cost that results from the policy
distortions or “favors” necessary to illicit contributions from interest groups. The
median voter will beneﬁt from a contribution ban if she prefers a pooling equilibrium
with no policy distortions to a separating equilibrium with distortions. This will be
true if the policy distortions in the separating equilibrium are large enough to out-
weigh the beneﬁt of distinguishing between candidate types (see Prat 2000). While a
ban may be beneﬁcial in such models, public ﬁnancing cannot improve the situation
4because it would remove the informational value of campaign spending and induce a
pooling equilibrium.
In models with directly informative advertising, the policy conclusions depend
signiﬁcantly on whether contributions are service or position induced. In the case
of position induced contributions, Coate (2003b) argues that banning contributions
may increase the likelihood that parties select ideologically extreme candidates. The
argument assumes that contributions are used to inform voters of a candidate’s ideo-
logical position. This gives moderate candidates an electoral advantage over extremist
opponents. Parties therefore have an incentive to select moderate candidates. Put
simply, “contributions help to produce more informed choices” and “the existence
of contributions provides parties with an incentive to select candidates with char-
acteristics that voters want” (ibid.). In the absence of such incentives, parties are
more likely to select candidates preferred by the median party member, rather than
the median voter. Therefore, contribution limits actually redistribute welfare from
moderate voters to party members, whose preferences diverge from the median.
In contrast, the independent work of Coate (2004) and Ashworth (2005) provides
an argument in favor of regulation, based on the assumption that contributions are
service-induced. The intuition underlying the argument is as follows. Contributions
are used to inform voters that a candidate is “qualiﬁed“, a characteristic that all
voters prefer. However, because contributions are service-induced, rational voters
may not have a strong preference for a qualiﬁed candidate in equilibrium, because
they are aware that such a candidate must promise favors in order to obtain the funds
necessary to advertise her qualiﬁcations. In the words of Coate (2004), voters are
“rationally cynical“. Under appropriate conditions, this implies that advertisements
are ineﬀective in equilibrium, so that qualiﬁed candidates have no electoral advantage.
Banning contributions will therefore have no eﬀect on the quality of the selected
leader, while reducing the amount of special interest favors. This implies a Pareto
improvement. Even under conditions where a ban is not Pareto improving, Coate
shows that an appropriate limit combined with a publicly ﬁnanced matching grant
can always create a Pareto improvement. This is because public money is not tainted
by promised favors, so that voters are no longer (as) “cynical“, which increases the
eﬀectiveness of advertising.
Summary As this brief review shows, the previous literature has primarily been
concerned with the eﬀect that campaign contributions may have on the behavior of
politicians. In particular, it has shown how politicians may shift their policy positions
or oﬀer favors to special interests in order to attract contributions. Thus, the impor-
tance of contributions in electoral competition can explain why politicians may take
positions or support programs diﬀerent from those preferred by the median voter. The
literature on informative advertising identiﬁes a tradeoﬀ between this (presumably)
negative aspect of contributions and their positive eﬀects in terms of information that
is made available to voters. This tradeoﬀ makes welfare analysis complicated, and
it has turned out that policy conclusions depend on assumptions made about the
informational impact of contributions and the motivation of contributors. None the
5less, the literature has contributed to the debate about campaign ﬁnance reform by
clarifying and formally elaborating diﬀerent arguments, without providing a deﬁnite
policy conclusion.
This paper The question I ask in this paper is slightly diﬀe r e n tf r o mw h a th a s
previously been addressed. Rather than focusing on the eﬀe c tt h a tc o n t r i b u t i o n s
may have on the behavior of politicians, I focus on the eﬀect that they may have
on the outcome of the election. Keeping policy positions ﬁxed, I investigate how
an asymmetry in the ability of two competing parties to raise contributions may
aﬀect their relative electoral chances. Such an asymmetry may arise, for instance,
because the supporters of the two parties diﬀer in average wealth. The purpose of the
analysis is to investigate formally the intuition that a contribution limit may help to
“level the playing ﬁeld” and therefore beneﬁt the supporters of the ﬁnancially weaker
party. To my knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to analyze this question formally. If the
previous literature is any indication, the conclusions may depend on the particular set
of assumptions employed. This will be discussed further in the conclusion. In terms
of the taxonomy developed above, the model I analyze assumes that contributions
are position-induced, voters are rational, and contributions are used to fund directly
informative advertising.
3M o d e l
3.1 General Setup
There are three types of voters in the model - left partisans, right partisans, and swing
voters. The fractions of the population belonging to each group are given by vL,v R,
and vS, respectively. These groups diﬀer in their ideology, which is measured on a scale
from 0 to 1. Left and right partisans have ideal points 0 and 1, respectively. Swing
voters have ideologies that are uniformly distributed on the interval [µ − τ,µ+ τ].
The ideology of the median swing voter is ex ante uncertain. Speciﬁcally, µ is the
realization of a random variable uniformly distributed on
£
1
2 − ε, 1
2 + ε
¤
,w h e r eε<
1
2 − τ.
In addition, there are two political parties, L and R, who put forth a candidate
characterized by an ideology and a level of qualiﬁcation, denoted qK for K ∈ {L,R}.
Party L’s candidate always has ideology 0, party R’s candidate always has ideology
1.P a r t y K’s candidate is ”qualiﬁed” (denoted qK =1 ) with probability σK,a n d
”unqualiﬁed” (denoted qK =0 ) with probability (1 − σK).
A citizen with ideology i enjoys a payoﬀ from having a representative of ideology
i0 and qualiﬁcation q that is given by u(i,i0,q)=δq−β|i−i0|. The parameters δ and
β represent the beneﬁt of having a qualiﬁed representative, and the cost of having a
representative with a diﬀerent ideology, respectively. I assume that partisans always
vote for their own party’s candidate, which implies that δ<β . I also assume that
vL < 1
2 and vR < 1
2, so that swing voters are decisive.
6Finally, each candidate is supported by one of two interest groups, composed of a
subset of the partisan voters. The size (mass) of the interest group K’s membership
is given by γK ≤ vK. These groups collect contributions from their members to pay
for campaign ”advertisements”3. As noted above, an important assumption in the
model is that advertising is truthful, in the sense that it reliably reveals the true
qualiﬁcation of the advertised candidate4. The advertising technology is deﬁned in
terms of a function λ(C) that gives the fraction of swing voters that learn the true
qualiﬁcation of a candidate as a function of campaign expenditures. That is, when
interest group K spends CK on the campaign, a fraction λ(CK) of swing voters will
come to know qK
5. λ(CK) is a strictly concave function. That is, each additional
dollar spent on advertising will cause a smaller and smaller number of additional
voters to become informed.
When making their spending decision, interest groups are assumed to know only
the type of their own, and not that of the opposing party’s candidate. They choose
contribution levels to maximize the utility of their members, whose preferences are
homogeneous. Swing voters are assumed to vote sincerely based on their ideological
preference and rational beliefs about candidate qualiﬁcations, given any advertise-
ments they may have seen6.
Some technical points Id e ﬁne κ =
vR−vL
vS as a measure of the ex ante “right-bias”
of the population. This parameter is allowed to be nonzero in order to show that the
main results of the analysis are unaﬀected by such an asymmetry. The reader may
prefer to assume that vR = vL,s ot h a tκ =0 .T h i ss i m p l i ﬁes many of the equations
without taking away any insight.
In addition, I will make the following assumptions, which make the model more
tractable.
Assumption (1): τ> δ
2β + ε; ε> δ




1−λ(C) for all C>0.
Intuitively, the ﬁrst assumption says that swing voters are suﬃciently heteroge-
nous, and that the preference of the median voter is suﬃciently uncertain, so that
it is impossible to forecast any election with certainty. It is introduced in order to
3More generally, ”advertisements” in this model can be interpreted to representent a broader
set of activities aimed at increasing the public exposure of a candidate. In reality, such activities
include, but are not limited to, television advertisements. The only thing that matters for the present
analysis is that such activities provide information about the candidate to voters, and that parties
require money to undertake them.
4Note that this assumption is not as naive as it may ﬁrst appear. Intuitively, it says that
advertisements cannot be used to ”fool” voters. If voters are rational, they will be able to distinguish
between credible signals and mere ”cheap talk”. The assumption says that qualiﬁed candidates are
able to send credible signals of their qualiﬁcation.
5Technical Note: The voters reached are assumed to be uniformally distributed accross all loca-
tions in the swing interval. In addition, there is no correlation between the probabilities of seeing
both parties’ ads.
6That is, voters are not permitted to rationally abstain or vote for a less preferred candidate in
this model (see Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996).
7ensure that election probabilities are continuously diﬀerentiable, and does not eﬀect
the substantive conclusions of the paper. The second assumption puts a lower bound
on the concavity of the advertising technology. It allows me to restrict attention to
the case where the equilibrium of the model is unique7. Both assumptions will be
referred to when they become important for the analysis.
3.2 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a set of contribution strategies for the interest groups, a voting
strategy for swing voters, and a set of beliefs for voters, such that (i) interest group
strategies are optimal given voter beliefs and given knowledge of their own candi-
date’s type, (ii) voters vote for their most preferred candidate, given beliefs about the
probabilities that they are qualiﬁed, and (iii) voter beliefs about candidate qualiﬁca-
tion are rational (i.e. derived from Bayes rule) given the strategies employed by the
interest groups.
The model is solved by backward induction, beginning with the behavior of swing
voters in the election stage. Analysis of the swing voter’s problem will allow me
to derive a probability of election function that describes the relationship between
contribution levels and election probabilities, given candidate types and voter beliefs.
This is then used to derive the interest group’s optimal contribution strategies given
candidate types. Finally, contribution strategies are used to tie down equilibrium
beliefs using Bayes rule.
Behavior of swing voters Suppose that realized candidate types are given by
qL and qR, and that the interest groups spend CL and CR on their campaigns. A
swing voter can be in one of four information states, depending on what, if any,
advertisements she may have seen. I denote an information state by a pair s =
(IL,I R),w h e r eIK =1if the voter has seen an ad for candidate K,a n dIK =0
otherwise. The set of information states is S = {(1,1),(1,0),(0,1),(0,0)}.T h e
spending levels CL and CR determine how many swing voters are in each information
state. Speciﬁcally, a fraction λ(CL) · λ(CR) is in information state (1,1),af r a c t i o n
λ(CL) · (1 − λ(CR)) is in information state (1,0), etc.
Voters in diﬀerent information states have diﬀerent beliefs concerning the likeli-
hood that the candidates are qualiﬁed. I denote these subjective probabilities by ρL(s)
and ρR(s). Since advertising is truthful, ρK(s)=qK whenever IK =1 .T h a ti s ,i fa
voter has seen an advertisement for candidate K, she knows with certainty whether K
is qualiﬁed. Further, since candidate types are drawn independently and advertising
decisions are independent of the opposing candidate’s type, ρL(0,0) = ρL(0,1) and
ρR(0,0) = ρR(1,0). That is, a voter’s belief about candidate L must be independent
of whether or not she has seen an advertisement for candidate R,a n dv i c ev e r s a .
7Note that this assumption is satisﬁed by the functional form assumed in Coate (2003), λ(C)=
C
C+α, for any α>0. See the appendix for a derivation of this condition as well as additional
examples.
8It follows that equilibrium beliefs can be fully summarized by a pair (b qL, b qR),w h e r e
b qK is a swing voter’s belief about the probability that candidate K is qualiﬁed, given
that he has not seen her ad. (b qK will be determined by Bayes rule in equilibrium.)
Given the information they have, swing voters are assumed to vote sincerely for
the candidate that oﬀers them the highest expected utility if elected. The expected
utility of a voter with ideology i in information state s if party K wins the election is
E [u(i,iK,q K)|s]=δ·ρL(s)−β·|i−iK|. A voter in information state s with ideology








· [ρL(s) − ρR(s)].
The probability of election function The function i∗(s) identiﬁes the voter who
is just indiﬀerent between the two candidates, given beliefs about the probabilities
that they are qualiﬁed. This marginal voter is of great importance, as she is in all
models of voting. However, it is important to keep in mind that there are several
such cut-points in the model discussed here. Speciﬁcally, the cut-point depends on
the information state. Therefore, the fraction of voters that votes for party L will
diﬀer across information states. It follows from the uniform distribution of swing






The fraction of all swing voters that votes for party L is then given by the weighted
sum of these fractions across information states, α(CL,C R)=λ(CL)·λ(CR)·α(1,1)+
λ(CL)·(1 − λ(CR))·α(1,0)+(1 − λ(CL))·λ(CR)·α(0,1)+(1 − λ(CL))·(1 − λ(CR))·
α(0,0). Candidate L will win the election if more than half of all voters vote for L,
that is if vL + vS · α(CL,C R) > 1






. This will occur if
µ<µ ∗ − τ · κ,w h e r eµ∗ = λ(CL) · λ(CR) · i∗(1,1) + λ(CL) · (1 − λ(CR)) · i∗(1,0) +
(1 − λ(CL)) · λ(CR) · i∗(0,1) + (1 − λ(CL)) · (1 − λ(CR)) · i∗(0,0) is the weighted
average of the diﬀerent cutoﬀ points, and κ =
vR−vL
vS measures how right-biased the
distribution of partisan voters is. It then follows from the distribution of µ that the
probability that L will win the election, given candidate types and spending levels, is
given by






+ η · [ρ(CL,q L, b qL) − ρ(CR,q R,,b qR)],( 1 )
where η = δ
4εβ,a n d
ρ(CK,q K, b qK)=λ(CK) · qK +( 1− λ(CK)) · b qK.
ρ(CK,q K, b qK) can be interpreted as candidate K’s average ”reputation”, given her
true type and advertising expenditures9. Thus, a candidate’s probability of winning
8Assumption (1) guarentees that α(s) ∈ (0,1) for all s ∈ S. This assumption is introduced only
to make sure that the probability of election function has a tractable, continuously diﬀerentiable
form. It does not aﬀect the substantive conclusions of the paper.
9Assumption (1) guarantees that L’s probability of winning lies strictly between zero and one.
Again, it is introduced only to ensure a tractable, continuously diﬀerentiable form.
9depends on the diﬀerence between the two candidates’ “reputations” among swing
voters.
Interest group contributions A strategy for interest group K is a contribution
schedule CK(qK).F o rqK ∈ {0,1}, C∗
K(qK) is the contribution level that maximizes
the expected utility of its representative member. This choice is conditioned only on
the type of the interest group’s own candidate, as the opposing candidate’s type is
assumed to be uncertain10. Without loss of generality, consider the problem of the
left interest group. Assuming that contribution costs are shared equally among the
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The optimal strategy C∗















Note that, according to equation (1),
∂πK(CL,CR,qL,qR)
∂CK = η ·
∂ρ(CK,qK)
∂CK .T h a t i s ,
spending aﬀects L’s probability of winning by changing her ”reputation”. Also note




0 (CL) · [qL − b qL]. When candidate L is unqualiﬁed, so that qL =0 ,
∂ρ(CL,qL)
∂CL < 0.
This reﬂects the simple fact that truthful advertising can only harm candidate L’s
reputation and reduce her chance of being elected when she is unqualiﬁed. When
qL =1 ,
∂ρ(CL,qL)
∂CL > 0,r e ﬂecting that a qualiﬁed candidate will improve her chance of
being elected through advertising.
It follows that only qualiﬁed candidates receive contributions and advertise in
equilibrium. Interest group K’s strategy can therefore be summarized by a single
number, C∗
K, which speciﬁes the contribution made when qK =1 .T h i s , i n t u r n ,
implies that equilibrium beliefs about unadvertised candidates are given by
b qK =
σK · (1 − λ(C∗
K))
1 − σK · λ(C∗
K)
What remains to be determined is C∗
L, the contribution given to a qualiﬁed can-
didate. Given rational beliefs, the equilibrium eﬀect of campaign spending on L’s




= η · λ
0(CL) · (1 − b qL).
10This assumption makes the analysis signiﬁcantly less cumbersome and easier to understand. If
interest groups can see the other candidate’s type, their incentive to advertise will depend on that
type’s realization. Therefore advertising would implicitly reveal information about both candidates’
types. While this may be more ”realistic”, it would signiﬁcantly complicate the analysis, and seems
unlikely to add insight.
10Before proceeding, it is helpful to look at this equation carefully in order to un-
derstand the eﬀect of spending in this model. When interest group L spends an
additional dollar on advertising, an additional λ
0(CL) voters will become informed of
L’s qualiﬁcation. These voters will change their beliefs about candidate L’s proba-
bility of qualiﬁcation from b qL to 1. Therefore candidate L’s “reputation” goes up by
λ
0(CL) · (1 − b qL). The parameter η translates this increment in reputation into an
increment in L’s probability of winning11.W h e nqL =1 , the group’s expected beneﬁt












3.3 Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
The analysis above has shown that an equilibrium can be summarized by four num-
bers, (C∗
L,C∗
R, b qL, b qR). C∗
K speciﬁes the contribution made to candidate K when she is
qualiﬁed, and b qK is the equilibrium belief of an uninformed voter concerning the prob-
ability that candidate K is qualiﬁed. I have shown that (C∗
L,C∗
R, b qL, b qR) constitute
an equilibrium if and only if, for K = L,R,
b qK =
σK · (1 − λ(C∗
K))












K > 0). (3)
The separability of the equilibrium conditions for the two parties signiﬁcantly
simpliﬁes the analysis of equilibrium. In particular, it allows me to begin by analyzing
the problem of one interest groups in isolation. I therefore drop the subscript K
when this does not create confusion. A rigorous proof of the following proposition is
relegated to the appendix.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique equilibrium (C∗
L,C∗
R, b qL, b qR).
Proof. See appendix.




L ≡ η · (1 − b qL)=η · 1−σL
1−σL·λ(C∗
L)can be interpreted as the ”eﬀectiveness of
advertising” consistent with rational beliefs on the part of voters. This parameter is used to simplify
some parts of the formal analysis, but will not be used in the text. See Coate (2003), in which it
plays a more central role. In that model, the eﬀectiveness of advertising is a function of the level
of ”favors” that must be oﬀered in order to ﬁnance it. Here, it depends only on the reputation of
unadvertised candidates.
12For the remainder of the analysis, I will assume that C∗
K > 0 for K = L,R.T h a t i s , I a m
assuming that interest groups are large enough, so that both parties do, in fact, have some access
to campaign funds. In this case, the second equilibrium condition will hold with equality for both
parties.
11Figure 1: Equilibrium beliefs about unadvertised candidates as a function of contri-
butions
Beliefs as a function of spending Equation (1) implicitly deﬁnes a function,
b q(C,σ)=
σ·(1−λ(C))
1−σ·λ(C) , which describes how a voter’s belief about an unadvertised can-
didate depends on the level of contributions her party provides to qualiﬁed candidates
in equilibrium. Rational beliefs imply that b q(C,σ) is decreasing in the equilibrium
level of spending (see ﬁg u r e1 ) .T h er e a s o nf o rt h i si sa sf o l l o w s .T h em o r eap a r t y
spends on qualiﬁed candidates in equilibrium, the more likely it is that a voter will see
their candidate’s ad when she is qualiﬁed. Consequently, the more a party spends on
campaigns in equilibrium, the less likely it is that their candidate is qualiﬁed, given
that a voter has not seen her ad.
Spending as a function of beliefs Equation (2) implicitly deﬁnes a function
C(b q,γ) that describes the contribution that the interest group will make to a qual-
iﬁed candidate, given its size and given beliefs on the part of voters concerning the
probability that an unadvertised candidate is qualiﬁed. This function is decreasing
in b q. The reason for this is clear. If voters believe that an unadvertised candidate is
very unlikely to be qualiﬁed, a qualiﬁed candidate will signiﬁcantly improve her rep-
utation if she advertises. In contrast, if voters think very highly even of unadvertised
candidates, there is little reason to advertise (see ﬁgure 2).
Equilibrium beliefs and spending A convenient way to visualize an equilibrium
of the model is by plotting the two equations in C − b q space (see ﬁgure 3). The
intersection of the two curves represents the point at which (1) beliefs are consistent
with the contributions made to qualiﬁed candidates, and (2) the interest group is
reacting optimally to beliefs. Proposition 1 says that the intersection of the two
12Figure 2: The equilibrium contribution schedule as a function of beliefs about unad-
vertised candidates.
curves exists and is unique.
3.4 Analysis of Equilibrium
In this section, I want to investigate how access to funds (formally, the parameters
γL and γR)a ﬀects three key properties of the equilibrium. These properties are
important in evaluating the eﬀect of a campaign ﬁnance policy in this model. First,
what is the probability that a particular party will win the election? Second, how
responsive is the election to the preference of the median swing voter? Third, what
is the probability that a qualiﬁed candidate will be elected?
The partisan eﬀects of funding asymmetries The result discussed in this sec-
tion shows that greater access to funds has both positive and negative eﬀects in this
model. In order to isolate these eﬀects, the following proposition assumes that both
parties have an equal probability of obtaining a qualiﬁed candidate, and that the
distribution of voter ideologies is symmetric. Further, it assumes that party R has
greater access to funds.
Proposition 2 Suppose that σL = σR = σ, κ =0 ,a n dγR >γ L.T h e n
1. Candidate R receives more contributions than L when she is qualiﬁed, and
2. The conditional probability that candidate R wins when she is qualiﬁed is larger
than the conditional probability that candidate L wins when she is qualiﬁed.
However,
13Figure 3: Equilibrium of beliefs and spending
3. Conditional on not being informed of a candidate’s qualiﬁcations, voters believe
that candidate R is less likely to be qualiﬁed than candidate L, and
4. The conditional probability that candidate R wins when she is unqualiﬁed is
smaller than the conditional probability that candidate L wins when she is un-
qualiﬁed.
Proof. See appendix.
Parts (1) and (2) of this proposition establish that the party that has better
access to contributions (party R in this case) enjoys an electoral advantage whenever
its candidate is qualiﬁed. Roughly speaking, this is because candidate R can spend
more money on advertisements. Therefore, a greater number of undecided voters will
learn that she is qualiﬁed and switch their votes to her. The consequence of this
is that a qualiﬁed candidate of party R is more likely to win an election than is a
qualiﬁed candidate of party L.
In contrast, parts (3) and (4) of the proposition establish that party R actually has
a disadvantage when its candidate is unqualiﬁed. The reason for this is that voters
will receive no information about unqualiﬁed candidates. In that instance, they are
less likely to give candidate R the ”beneﬁt of the doubt”. That is, rational beliefs
imply that voters factor in the candidates’ diﬀerent signalling abilities and impose a
kind of “handicap” on the stronger party’s candidate.
To understand the mechanism that underlies this result intuitively, imagine the
situation of a voter who has received no information about either candidate. Such an
individual will reason something like this: ”Candidate R has many wealthy support-
ers. If she was qualiﬁed, she would have been able to advertise aggressively, so that I
14would probably have found out about it. Candidate L has fewer wealthy supporters.
Even if she was qualiﬁed, she may not have been able to get the word out, so that
it is pretty likely that I would never have found out about it. Therefore, L is more
likely to be qualiﬁed.” The consequence of this is that an unqualiﬁed candidate R is
less likely to win an election than is an unqualiﬁed candidate L.
Proposition (2) isolates the diﬀerent eﬀects of a funding asymmetry conditional on
candidate qualiﬁcations. The main result of the paper summarizes the total impact
of such asymmetries from an ex ante perspective. It can be stated as follows.
Proposition 3 The ex ante probability that party L’s candidate will win the election










+ η · (σL − σR)
Proof. See appendix.
Contrary to the initial intuition that motivated the analysis, proposition (3) es-
tablishes that the positive and negative eﬀects identiﬁed in proposition (2) cancel
out, so that funding asymmetries will not skew electoral outcomes from an ex ante
perspective. In the absence of other asymmetries, both parties have an equal chance
of winning the election, irrespective of any diﬀerences in their access to funds. Any
ex ante advantage for either party that does exist (because either κ 6=0or σL 6= σR)
would be unaﬀected by a change in funding levels.
Access to contributions and the ideological responsiveness of the election
Recall that the ideology of the median swing voter, µ, is ex ante uncertain. From the
point of view of swing voters, one of the main functions of the election is to select
a leader who is ideologically preferred by the median swing voter. From an ex ante
perspective, a useful measure of the “ideological responsiveness” of the election is the
expected distance between µ and the ideology of the winner.
Proposition 4 Increased access to campaign funds (formally an increase in γK)f o r
either party implies an increase in the expected ideological distance between the median
voter and the winner of the election.
Proof. See appendix.
Thus, the more access the parties have to campaign funds, the less responsive the
election is to the median swing voter’s ideology. At ﬁrst glance, this result seems
to resemble the policy divergence that occurs in some of the models discussed in
section 2. However, the logic here is diﬀerent. Recall that the parties’ platforms
are exogenously ﬁxed, and assumed to be distinct from the median ideology. Thus,
campaign contributions are not causing platforms to move in this context. Rather,
they are inﬂuencing voters choices, making it less likely that they will choose the
candidate who is ideologically closer to them.
15The reason for this is as follows. Voters evaluate candidates on two dimensions,
ideology and qualiﬁcation. Better access to funds induces parties to provide informa-
tion about candidate qualiﬁcations to more voters. (In addition, it also increases the
amount of implicit information revealed by the absence of such information.) The
more information a voter has about the candidates’ qualiﬁcations (either explicit or
implicit), the more likely it is that he will switch his vote from a candidate whom he
prefers based on ideology alone to one that he prefers based on the likelihood that
she is qualiﬁed. Therefore, the more information is made available, the more likely it
is that the ideologically less preferred candidate will be elected.
Access to contributions and the probability that the winner of the election
is qualiﬁed The other major function of the election in this model is to select a
qualiﬁed leader. Therefore the ﬁnal question of interest is, with what probability is
the winner of the election qualiﬁed, and how is this probability related to the parties’
access to funds? The corresponding result is no surprise.
Proposition 5 Increased access to campaign funds (formally an increase in γK)f o r
either party implies an increase in the probability that the winner of the election is
qualiﬁed.
Proof. See appendix.
The reasoning behind this result is straightforward. The only point to make is
that there are two reinforcing mechanisms at work here. First, the more information
voters have about qualiﬁcation, the more likely it is that they will correctly identify
aq u a l i ﬁed candidate. Second, the more information voters have about qualiﬁcation,
the more likely it is that they will decide based on this information rather than the
candidate’s ideology.
Summary To summarize, the results presented in this section suggest that restrict-
ing access to funds by limiting contributions will (a) not eﬀect the ex ante probability
that either party wins, (b) increase the “ideological responsiveness” of the election to
t h ep r e f e r e n c eo ft h em e d i a ns w i n gv o t e r ,a n d( c )d e c r e a s et h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a tt h e
winner of the election will be qualiﬁed. These eﬀects are investigated in more detail
in the next section.
3.5 Contribution Limits
This section discusses the eﬀects of a campaign ﬁnance policy that imposes limits
on contributions. The analysis has already shown that such a policy cannot eﬀect
the ex ante probability that either party is elected. It follows that the welfare eﬀects
of such a policy depend on the combination of its impacts on what I have called
the ideological responsiveness of the election and the probability that the winner is
qualiﬁed.
16Equilibrium under a limit Suppose a policy is introduced that sets a limit C on
spending. The eﬀect of such a limit on the equilibrium is straightforward. Formally,
contribution levels and beliefs
³
e CL, e CR, e qL, e qR
´
constitute an equilibrium under a limit
C if and only if for K = L,R,
0 ≤ e CK ≤ C
e qK =
σK · (1 − λ(e CK))
1 − σK · λ(e CK)
and
η · λ





γK if e CK =0
= 1





γK if e CK = C
We can deﬁne the equilibrium contribution function under a limit C using our







C∗ (γK,σK,σ−K) if C∗ (γK,σ K,σ −K) ≤ C
Co t h e r w i s e
That is, the new contribution function is simply truncated at C.
Evaluating the eﬀect of a limit Suppose that the laissez-faire equilibrium in-
volves contribution levels (C∗
L,C∗
R). Suppose also that party R receives more con-
tributions when its candidate is qualiﬁed, i.e. that C∗
L <C ∗
R. In this section, I ask
how the welfare of the diﬀerent agents in the model is eﬀected by the introduction
of a contribution limit. In order to understand the eﬀects, it is best to focus on the
case where the limit is binding for interest group R, but not for interest group L,
i.e. C∗
L < C<C ∗
R. The intuition that motivated this analysis suggested that such a
policy might have redistributive eﬀects, beneﬁtting left partisans (and possibly swing
voters) at the expense of right partisans. As the following proposition shows, this
intuition is incorrect within the model employed here.
Proposition 6 Suppose that C∗
R >C ∗
L in the laissez-faire equilibrium. Then (1) the
imposition of a limit C∗
L < C<C ∗
R will reduce the expected utility of all citizens who




that the expected utility of the right interest group’s members is higher under that limit
than in the laissez-faire equilibrium.
Proof. See appendix.
To understand the result intuitively, note ﬁr s tt h a tt h el i m i ta ﬀects equilibrium
spending and electoral outcomes in essentially the same way as a reduction in the size
of the right interest group would. It then follows from Proposition 2 that it will have
no eﬀect on the ex ante probability that either party will win the election. According
17to the other propositions, it will (a) reduce the expected ideological distance between
the winner of the election and the median swing voter, and (b) reduce the probability
that the winner of the election will be qualiﬁed. In addition to these eﬀects, the policy






Consider ﬁrst the welfare of agents who are not members of interest group R.S i n c e
partisan voters who are not members of interest group R don’t care about (a) or (c),
it follows immediately from (b) that they are worse oﬀ under the limit than in the
laissez-faire equilibrium. Although eﬀect (a) is actually a good thing from the point
of view of swing voters, it is not surprising that eﬀect (b) dominates, so that they are
also worse oﬀ under the limit. Intuitively, the expected ideological distance from the
median is lower under the limit only because more voting decisions are based only on
the ideological positions of the candidates, with no knowledge of whether or not they
are qualiﬁed. This changes the outcome of the election only because some uninformed
voters are voting for the candidate closer to them in ideology even though they would
have preferred the other candidate, had they known that she was qualiﬁed. It follows
that these voters are making the “wrong” choice, and must be worse oﬀ under the
limit.
Finally, consider the members of the right interest group. These agents are eﬀected
in two ways. First, they suﬀer a loss due to the reduced probability that the winner
will be qualiﬁed. Second, they gain because they spend less on contributions. To
understand why the second eﬀect can dominate the ﬁrst, note that from an ex ante
perspective, the information revealed by the group’s advertising activities is like a
public good. It aﬀects only the probability that a qualiﬁed leader is elected, not the
probability that the group’s preferred candidate will win. However, the group will
decide how much information to provide after they have learned that their candidate
is qualiﬁed. At that point in time, the advertising activity has an additional private
component. Conditional on being qualiﬁed, the contributions will raise the probability
that their candidate will win. That is, equilibrium contributions are motivated by
ideological (private) as well as qualiﬁcation (private and public) considerations, and
the sum contributed will reﬂect both of these. Before the realization of candidate
types, the private component is absent, so that the members of the interest group will
feel that they are contributing “too much” from an ex ante perspective. Therefore,
they would prefer to commit to some lower level of contributions. A contribution
limit would provide them with a device to do this. From an ex ante perspective,
these agents will beneﬁt if the contribution limit is set at (or close to) the level which
they would like to commit to from an ex ante perspective. I show formally in the
appendix that this level is strictly lower than the equilibrium contribution.
3.6 Extension: Endogenous probability of qualiﬁcation
An important theoretical objection to the model presented here is that the ability of
parties to obtain qualiﬁed candidates is treated as an exogenous parameter. It can
be argued that qualiﬁed candidates may be more likely to emerge if they are more
18likely to win the election. Since the advantages of funding are enjoyed by qualiﬁed
candidates in the model analyzed here, this implies that the ﬁnancially stronger party
m a yb em o r el i k e l yt oo b t a i naq u a l i ﬁed candidate in equilibrium, giving it an electoral
advantage from an ex ante perspective. As a consequence, electoral outcomes can be
said to be biased in favor of that party. In this case, an argument can be made that
public ﬁnancing can help to eliminate this bias by increasing the incentives for the
weaker partie’s qualiﬁed candidates to run. Analyzing the welfare eﬀects of such a
policy presents additional challenges that go beyond the scope of the present analysis.
Here, I merely want to establish the positive result that an advantage in access to
funds will imply that a party is more likely to obtain a qualiﬁed candidate.
The simplest way to endogenize the probability that a party ﬁnds a qualiﬁed
candidate is to assume that each party has one qualiﬁed and one unqualiﬁed “potential
candidate“. While the unqualiﬁed candidate is always willing to run, the qualiﬁed
candidate faces a random opportunity cost of running and will do so only if he beneﬁt
exceeds this cost. For simplicity, assume that candidates are purely oﬃce motivated,
so that they receive an ego rent equal to r>0 if and only if they win the election.
Also assume that the candidate’s opportunity cost is distributed uniformly on [0,¯ c]
where ¯ c ≥ r. Then, given a probability of winning πK
Q,c a n d i d a t eK will run if and
only if c ≤ πK
Q ·r. This occurs with probability r
¯ c ·πQK. For simplicity, assume r
¯ c =1 .
Then, letting πK
Q (σK,σ −K,γK) denote the equilibrium probability that party K’s
qualiﬁed candidate wins when (σK,σ−K,γK) are exogenously given, an equilibrium

















Then, the following result is proved in the appendix.
Proposition 7 Suppose that κ =0 ,a n dγR >γ L.T h e n ,σ∗
R >σ ∗
L and the ex ante
probability that party R’s candidate wins is larger than the ex ante probability that
party L’s candidate wins.
Proof. See appendix
As indicated above, this result raises new questions concerning policy. Speciﬁcally,
it appears possible that voters may beneﬁt from a combination of contribution limits
and public ﬁnancing in order to increase the incentives for qualiﬁed candidates for
party L to run. This would reduce the partisan advantage that candidate R enjoys
in the laissez-faire equilibrium. At this point, the welfare analysis of such a policy
presents a number of technical challenges and is therefore left for future research.
194C o n c l u s i o n
There are two arguments commonly raised in support of campaign ﬁnance regulation.
One is that such policies may reduce incentives for politicians to serve special interests
through favors or shifts in their policy positions. Another is that regulation can
help to “level the playing ﬁeld” in the competition between parties and candidates
representing the interests of citizens who diﬀer in their ability to provide ﬁnancial
support. As outlined in section 2, the formal literature on campaign ﬁnance policy has
primarily examined the ﬁrst argument. One of the central lessons that has emerged
from this variable literature has been that both positive and normative conclusions
depend strongly on assumptions made about the role of campaign advertisements,
the rationality of voters, and the motivation of contributors.
To my knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to investigate the second argument in
a formal context. The main conclusions of the analysis are theoretically simple, yet
somewhat surprising intuitively. They suggest that, if advertising is informative, and
if voters rationally update their beliefs taking into account the ability of candidates to
advertise, an advantage in access to funds has both positive and negative eﬀects. In
the model presented here, these eﬀects precisely cancel out, so that electoral outcomes
are not systematically skewed in favor of the ﬁnancially stronger party.
The analysis lends some support to Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent to the Supreme
Court’s decision on Dec. 10th 2003, upholding the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.
Justice Scalia argues that “the premise of the First Amendment is that the American
people are neither sheep nor fools, and hence fully capable of considering both the
substance of the speech presented to them and its proximate and ultimate source.
(...) Given the premises of democracy, there is no such thing as too much speech.”
While the existence of countervailing advantages and disadvantages of ﬁnancial
access is intuitively appealing, the conclusion that the stronger party has no ex ante
advantage stands in contrast to casual empiricism, and may be quite sensitive to the
particular theoretical speciﬁcation. This suggests a need for empirical testing and
experimentation with alternative theoretical formulations.
Even if voters are “neither sheep nor fools“, it may appear questionable whether
they can and do engage in the fairly sophisticated Bayesian reasoning that underlies
the main results of the paper. It would be interesting to test empirically whether
voters take a party’s ability to raise campaign funds into account when they evaluate
candidates about whom they have obtained little information. Another way to test
the model would be to collect evidence about the relative chances of “qualiﬁed” and
“unqualiﬁed” candidates belonging to diﬀerent parties. Of course, this would require
a precise deﬁnition of qualiﬁcation. According to the theory presented here, such
an investigation should show that a party’s access to funds has positive eﬀects for
qualiﬁed, and negative eﬀects for unqualiﬁed candidates. If such eﬀects should exist,
it would also be interesting to quantify their relative magnitudes in order to evaluate
the model’s rather stark result that they are exactly oﬀsetting.
An important theoretical objection to the model is that the ability of parties to
obtain qualiﬁed candidates is treated as an exogenous parameter. It can be argued
20that qualiﬁed candidates may be more likely to emerge if they are more likely to win
the election. Since the advantages of funding are enjoyed by qualiﬁed candidates in
the model analyzed here, this implies that the ﬁnancially stronger party will be more
likely to obtain a qualiﬁed candidate in equilibrium, giving it an electoral advantage
from an ex ante perspective. Future research should aim to develop a tractable model
that endogenizes the probability of obtaining a qualiﬁed candidate.
5 Appendix
The formal analysis that follows uses an alternative (but equivalent) deﬁnition of the
equilibrium, which is technically more convenient. Deﬁne ξ (b q)=η · (1 − b q).N o t e
that for a qualiﬁed candidate,
∂πK(.)
∂CK = λ
0(CK)·ξ(b q).T h u s ,ξ(b q) can be thought of as
measuring the “eﬀectiveness of advertising” as a function of beliefs. An equilibrium






R) such that for K = L,R,
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K > 0). (5)
Equation 3 implicitly deﬁnes a function, ξ (C,σ)=η · 1−σ
1−σ·λ(C), which describes
how the ”eﬀectiveness of advertising” depends on the level of spending and the ex
ante probability of qualiﬁcation. Note that this function is increasing in C.T h a t
is, the more an interest group spends on advertising, the greater is the eﬀect of an
advertisement on the behavior of a swing voters who sees it.
To understand why this is so, recall that a voter who sees an advertisement will
change his beliefs from b qK to 1. The size of this increment, and therefore the eﬀect
of the ad, is decreasing in b qK.B u t b qK itself is decreasing in the equilibrium level
of spending (see ﬁgure 1). Taken together, this implies that the eﬀectiveness of
advertising is increasing in the equilibrium level of spending
Now consider the function Φ(C,σ)=ξ (C,σ) · λ
0(C). This function describes
how the eﬀectiveness of an additional dollar spent on advertising depends on the
equilibrium level of spending. Assumption (2) implies that Φ(C,σ) is monotone
decreasing in C. It then follows that the interest groups’ ﬁrst order conditions have
unique solutions.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Deﬁne Φ(C,σ)=ξ (C,σ)· λ
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γK · (β +( 1− σ−K) · δ)
(= if C
∗
K > 0) for K = L,R
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The RHS of this condition is constant in C. The derivative of the RHS is
∂Φ(C,σ)
∂C








Since σK ∈ (0,1), σK · [λ
0(C)]
2 +( 1− σK · λ(C)) · λ
00(C) < [λ
0(C)]
2 +( 1− λ(C)) ·
λ
00(C) < 0 by assumption 2. Therefore there exists a unique C∗
K which satisﬁes the
condition. Q.E.D..
Examples of advertising technologies As examples, it is straightforward to
check that Assumption (2) is satisﬁed for λ(C)= C
C+α, for all α>0,a sw e l la s
for λ(C)=1− exp[−α · C],f o ra l lα>0. I have not been able to come up with an
example that satisﬁes the conditions λ(0) = 0,λ
0(C) > 0 and λ
00(C) < 0 for all C,
and limC→∞λ(C)=1 , is continuously diﬀerentiable, but fails to satisfy Assumption
(2).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Deﬁne C∗(γK, σK, σ−K) to be the unique equilibrium contribution level given γK,
σK,a n dσ−K.A l s od e ﬁne the following functions.
Ω(γK,σ−K)=
1
γK · (β +( 1− σ−K) · δ)
Φ(C,σK)=ξ (C,σK) · λ
0(C)
Recall that the unique equilibrium contribution level satisﬁes the FOC
Φ(C
∗(γK,σK,σ−K),σK) ≤ Ω(γK,σ−K) (= if C
∗(γK,σK,σ−K) > 0)
This implies that C∗(γK,σ K,σ−K) > 0 iﬀ
γK > [η · (1 − σK) · λ
0(0) · (β +( 1− σ−K) · δ)]
−1
By assumption, both γK exceed this threshold. Therefore contributions are strictly
positive, and C∗(γK,σK,σ−K) is implicitly deﬁned by
Φ(C
∗(γK,σ K,σ −K),σ K)=Ω(γK,σ −K) (6)












Therefore γR >γ L implies C∗(γR,σ,σ) >C ∗(γL,σ,σ).A saf u n c t i o no fC, equilib-
rium beliefs are b q(C)=
σ·(1−λ(C))
1−σ·λ(C) .S i n c e λ
0(C) > 0, we have b q0(C) < 0. Therefore
b q(C∗(γR,σ,σ)) < b q(C∗(γL,σ,σ)).23
Claims 2 and 4 Recall that the probability that L wins the election, given candi-
date types and spending levels, is






+ η · [ρ(CL,q L, b qL) − ρ(CR,q R, b qR)].
Suppose that candidate L is unqualiﬁed and candidate R is qualiﬁed. Then, L’s








2ε + η[b qL − λ(C∗
R) − (1 − λ(C∗
R)) b qR]=1
2 − τ·κ
2ε +[ ( 1− λ(CR))ξR − ξL].D e n o t e
this probability by π
UQ
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.N o t i c e t h a t
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∗
K,σK) · [1 − σK · (1 − λ(C
∗
K))] > 0.
Similar calculations show that the conditional probability of winning when L is




























P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
R e f e r r i n gb a c kt ot h ep r o b a b i l i t i e sc a l c u l a t e di nt h ep r e v i o u sp r o o f ,w ec a ns e et h a t
the unconditional ex ante probability that L wins is
π
L = σL · π
L
































+ η · (1 − σR) − η · (1 − σL)
Q.E.D.24
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
Recall that L wins the election if µ<µ ∗ − τ · κ. Consider the case where (qL,q R)=
(0,0). This case occurs with probability (1 − σL)(1− σR). Neither candidate is
qualiﬁed. Thus, µ∗ = 1
2 + δ
2β (b qL − b qR). S ot h el e f tc a n d i d a t ew i l lw i ni fµ<
¡
1
2 − τ · κ
¢
+ δ
2β (b qL − b qR). If so, then |µ − z| = µ, otherwise |µ − z| =1−µ.D e n o t e
¡
1
2 − τ · κ
¢
+ δ








(1−µ) dF(µ). After a bit of work, this simpliﬁes to E (|µ − z||(qL,q R)=( 0 ,0)) =
1−ε
2 +2 ε ·
¡
(ξR − ξL) − τκ
2ε
¢2. Similar calculations for the other cases show that
E (|µ − z||(qL,q R)=( 1 ,0)) = 1−ε
2 +2 ε ·
¡
(ξR − (1 − λ(CL)) · ξL) − τκ
2ε
¢2,
E (|µ − z||(qL,q R)=( 0 ,1)) = 1−ε
2 +2 ε ·
¡
((1 − λ(CR)) · ξR − ξL) − τκ
2ε
¢2,a n d
E (|µ − z||(qL,q R)=( 1 ,1)) = 1−ε
2 +2 ε
¡
((1 − λ(CR))ξR − (1 − λ(CL))ξL) − τκ
2ε
¢2.






ε · η · (σR − σL)
+2ε·
P
K=L,R{[1 − σK · λ(CK) · (2 − λ(CK))]·ξ
2
K−[1−σK·λ(CK)][1−σ−K·λ(C−K)]·




















P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
The probability that the winner of the election is qualiﬁed is given by πQ = σL·σR+
σL · (1 − σR) · πL

















− (1 − λ(C∗




(σR − σL) · τ

















P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
Note ﬁrst that equilibrium contributions under a limit C ∈ (C∗
L,C∗




. Now consider a marginal reduction of C. The reader can refer back to the25
argument in the proof of Proposition 3 to verify that this will not eﬀect the probability
that either party will win the election. The proofs of Propositions 4 and 5 show that
(a) the eﬀect on the expected ideological distance from the median swing voter is
given by −
∂E[|µ−z|]
∂CR < 0, and that (b) the eﬀect on the probability that the winner is
qualiﬁed is given by −
∂πQ(C∗
L,C)
∂CR < 0. In addition to these eﬀects, (c) interest group
R’s per capita contribution level will drop by 1
γR.
It’s immediately clear that partisan voters who are not members of interest group
R will be eﬀected only by (b), so they must be worse oﬀ under a limit. To see that
swing voters are also worse oﬀ, we need to consider the sum of eﬀects (a) and (b).










































(1 − σR) · λ(C)
1 − σR · λ(C)
¶
< 0.
To see part (2), recall that the laissez-faire level of spending C∗
R > 0 was chosen by




R) · ξ (C
∗
R,σR) · (β +( 1− σL) · δ)=
1
γR
Now, suppose that the group is permitted to commit to some contribution level
b CR ex ante. Since spending has no ex ante eﬀect on πR,t h e nb CR would be chosen to






















σR · (1 − σR)
1 − σR · λ(b CR)
!




R) · ξ (C
∗











R) · ξ (C∗
R,σR)
λ





1 − σR · λ(b CR)
·
δ
(β +( 1− σL) · δ)26
Recall that δ<βby assumption. Therefore it’s clear that
(1 − σR) · δ<
³
1 − σR · λ(b CR)
´




R) · ξ (C∗
R,σR)
λ




By assumption 2, λ
0(C) · ξ (C,σ) is decreasing in C. It follows that b CR <C ∗
R.T h i s
establishes part (2) of the proposition. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7
In order to endogenize the probability that candidate K is qualiﬁed, we assume that
each party’s qualiﬁed candidate runs iﬀ
c ≥ πQK (σK,σ−K,γK) · r
where c ∼ F(c)=1
¯ c,a n dπQK (σK,σ −K,γK) is the equilibrium probability of winning
when (σK,σ−K,γK) are exogenously given for the model analyzed above.


















· πQK (s(σ−K,γK),σ −K,γK)
For simplicity, assume r












































∂γK > 0.( P r o o f :F o r a l l (σK,σ−K),w ek n o wf r o mt h e
previous analysis that πQK (σK,σ −K,γK) is increasing in γK.) Hence
∂σ∗
K



































K (σK,σ−K,γK) and ξ
X
K (σK,σ−K,γK) denote the equilibrium outcomes when
































































































































































































K (σK,σ−K,γK) is implicitly deﬁned by
η · γK ·
1 − σK
1 − σK · λ
X
K


























































































































































































































(Recall that by assumption, (1 − λ) · C00(λ) >C 0 (λ) for all λ.)29
Claim 1 Suppose (1 − λ) · C00(λ) >C 0 (λ) for all λ and β is large enough. Then
∂s(σ−K,γK)



































































To see that this is negative, note that
∂λX
K
∂σ−K < 0, so the numerator is negative. Further,


















2.T h u s ,
∂s(σ−K,γK)
∂σ−K < 0.F i n a l l y ,t os e et h a t
∂s(σ−K,γK)




















































































































= η · γK ·
1 − σK
1 − σK · λ
X
K






















For β large enough, this is negative. Intuitively, this says that σK has a stronger
negative impact on equilibrium spending than σ−K. That is, the level of spending in30
the exogenous quality model is determined mainly by the eﬀectiveness of advertising
and not by the probability that the opponent is qualiﬁed. Then I’ve established that
∂s(σ−K,γK)
∂σ−K ∈ (0,1).
This establishes that, when γR >γ R, σ∗
R >σ ∗
L. Finally, note that the ex ante
probability that candidate R wins is given by πL = 1




Example To understand the result, consider the following example. If γL = γR =0 ,
we have
πQK (σK,σ −K,0) =
1
2
































and the unique equilibrium is σ∗
L = σ∗
R = 1
2.N o t et h a tt h es l o p eo fs(σ−K,0) is less
than 1 in absolute value. Then, suppose γR is raised while γL remains the same.


















R < (1 − σR). Hence πQR (σR,σ L,γR) >
1
2 + η · (σR − σL)=πQR (σR,σ L,0) for all (σR,σL). Then, s(σL,γR) shifts up while
s(σR,0) remains the same. Denote the increment in s(σL,γR) by ∆(σL,γL) > 0.

























so that we must have σ∗
R > 1
2 >σ ∗
L. When both interest groups are larger than zero,
the expressions are more diﬃcult to deal with but the result extends provided the
assumptions cited are satisﬁed. Note that those assumptions did not play a role in
the example, however.31
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